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1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized the relationship between geographic location and
income. Using international data, Moreno and Trehan (1997) provide evidence that being
close to large markets contributes to income growth. Similarly, using a panel of US
counties, Hanson (1998) finds that proximity to a large market has a positive effect on
earnings. Recent literature on economic geography summarizes the channel through which
location affects income (Overman et al. 2001). Location exerts its impact on both the
demand and the supply side of an economy. On the demand side, when a location is far
away from its target market, the potential demand for the goods and services in the location
is less than in other locations closer to the market. On the production side, if a location is
far away from the suppliers of intermediate inputs, the costs of production will be
relatively high and value added is then reduced.
In this paper, we examine the link between each province’s geographic location and
provincial wage rates in China. In particular, we investigate the extent to which the
increasing wage gap between the coastal and the interior regions is associated with each
province’s access to the international output markets and the suppliers of intermediate
inputs. This study uses Redding and Venables’ (2000) methodology, which examines the
role of geography in shaping the evolution of the cross-country distribution of income.
The Chinese case is interesting for several reasons. First, income inequality has always
been an important and sensitive political issue since the foundation of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949. Kanbur and Zhang (2001) examine fifty years of regional
inequality in China and find that there have been three phases of rising inequality during
the past fifty years. One appeared in the late 1950s, one was in the late 1960s, and one was
in the 1990s. It is worth noting that the regional inequality in the 1990s is more serious
than that experienced in the 1960s and is similar to that experienced in the 1950s. Many
studies on China’s income inequality suggest that foreign trade and investment might have
caused China’s income inequality in the 1990s.1 To my knowledge, however, no research
has been conducted to explicitly uncover the mechanism by which international trade
affects regional wages. This paper is the first attempt to explore the relationship between
regional wage rates and international trade.
Second, the increasing income inequality in China after its trade liberalization in the late
1970s has coincided with the international trend towards an increasing wage gap between
high- and low-skilled workers. During the last two decades, increasing wage inequality has
been observed in many industrialized countries (Freeman and Katz 1994; Katz and Autor
1999) and also Mexico (Cragg and Epelbaum 1996; Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Hanson
                                                
1 Jian et al. (1996), Kanbur and Zhang (1999), Tsui (1998), Hussain et al. (1994), Chen and Fleisher (1996),
Khan et al. (1993).2
and Harrison 1999).2 There are three explanations for the increasing wage gap. One is
international competition from low-wage countries (Leamer 1993:57-162, 1994; Borjas
and Ramey 1993; Wood 1994). The second is skilled-biased technological change due to
the increased use of computers (Davis and Haltiwanger 1991; Lawrence and Slaughter
1993; Berman et al. 1994). The third is global outsourcing (Katz and Murphy 1992;
Feenstra and Hanson 1996:89–127). However, most of the literature has focused on
industrialized economies, while wage inequality in developing countries has not drawn
much attention.3 China, the largest developing country in the world, underwent economic
reform in the late 1970s and actively engaged in global outsourcing. Hsieh and Woo
(1999) provide evidence that outsourcing from Hong Kong to China has been associated
with an increase in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labour in Hong Kong. It is
natural, then, to expect that similar wage movements would take place in China.
Instead of examining the wage gap between skilled–unskilled workers, we explore wage
inequality in a different dimension—the wage gap between the coastal and the interior
provinces. As illustrated in recent studies, the wage inequality in China is manifesting
itself more in the form of regional inequality rather than in wage inequality between skilled
and unskilled workers, and regional wage inequality is strongly associated with the
regional distribution of international trade.
Another reason for considering province-level data is that we are not able to apply the
standard classification of skill in the Chinese labour market. The conventional approach
distinguishes skill levels by classifying workers into non-production and production.
Unfortunately, this distinction is not reported in the China statistical yearbook. Instead, an
education index appears. The fact that college-educated workers account for a small
percentage of the workforce in China makes the education index a poor way to classify
workers.
1.1 Market access
My work follows recent literature on economic geographic models which use market
access as an important variable in determining income. Market access was first defined in
Harris (1954), where he argues that the potential demand for goods and services in a
location depends upon the distance-weighted GDP in all locations. Other related work
includes papers by Hummels (1995), and Leamer (1997) and Hanson (1996a,b). Krugman
and Venables (1995) draw special attention to the implications of increasing returns to
scale and include it in their framework. Redding and Venables (2000) extend the Krugman
and Venables (1995) trade theory model to include transportation costs in trade and
intermediate goods in production. They define ‘market access’ as the proximity of an
                                                
2 Feenstra and Hanson (2001).
3 Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Hanson and Harrison (1999) are two notable exceptions. Both examine the
increase in relative wages for skilled workers in Mexico.3
exporting country to its output market and, ‘supplier access’ as the proximity of an
importing country to its supply of intermediate inputs.
As a prelude to the analysis, using data on the Chinese provinces for the period 1988-98,
we first estimate a gravity equation to construct market access and supplier access
variables. Second, we estimate the wage equation using the constructed market access and
supplier access. Having estimated the model, we compare the predicted wage gap obtained
in the model to the one obtained from the observed data, and evaluate the extent to which
the gap in wages can be explained by differences in regional market access and supplier
access.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly
introduce China’s spatial economy. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4
explains the estimation strategies. We describe the data sources and measurement in
Section 5. Section 6 reports the estimation results and robustness tests. We offer
concluding remarks and policy implications in Section 7.
2 China’s spatial economy
China is a very large country covering 6,000,000 square miles with 30 administrative
divisions.4,5 Geographic features in China differ greatly from one province to the next,
though the variety of natural landscape is not the focus of this paper. Here, we mainly
introduce stylized facts about the spatial distribution of economic activity in China.
First, regional income varies dramatically across provinces. Table 1 presents the income
inequality in China in 1995. There are three alternative measures of income: the average
real wage rate, GDP per capita, and the average real wage rate in the manufacturing sector.
The first row in the table shows the national average for each measure of income. We
divide the Chinese provinces into two groups: coastal and interior regions.6 Among the
coastal group, the real wage rates in most provinces are higher than the national average
except Liaoning, Shandong and Hainan. Liaoning and Shandong are two provinces where
there is much state-owned heavy industry, which used to play an important role in the local
economy. Since China underwent economic reform, state-owned companies have faced
competition from joint ventures and privately owned enterprises. The operation of state-
owned enterprise  is not as efficient as that of  other enterprises. However,  state-owned
                                                
4 Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu,
Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.
5 Tibet is excluded from our sample due to the lack of data.
6 Coastal regions include Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong,
Guangdong, and Hainan. Interior regions include Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Anhui,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangxi Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Yunnan, and
Guizhou.4
Table 1: Income inequality across provinces in 1995





Average 1514 1480 1437
Coastal
Beijing 2287 3132 2126
Tianjin 1826 2889 1691
Liaoning 1379 1945 1270
Shanghai 2606 5315 2496
Jiangsu 1669 2049 1593
Zhejiang 1859 2256 1701
Fujian 1645 1918 1666
Shandong 1445 1614 1328
Guangdong 2317 2355 2222
Hainan 1500 1413 1443
Interior
Hebei 1359 1243 1268
Shanxi 1326 997 1148
Inner Mongolia 1161 1024 1034
Jilin 1244 1243 1160
Heilongjiang 1164 1529 1019
Anhui 1294 938 1192
Jiangxi 1183 861 1106
Henan 1220 927 1133
Hubei 1316 1164 1258
Hunan 1347 971 1274
Guangxi 1434 993 1491
Sichuan 1304 889 1298
Guizhou 1257 502 1321
Yunnan 1446 850 1594
Shaanxi 1234 655 1149
Gansu 1543 795 1541
Qinghai 1616 638 1337
Ningxia 1426 965 1333
Xinjiang 1502 931 1466
Note: *Wage is the real wage rate of formal employees. **Wage in the manufacturing sector is the real wage
rate of formal employees in the manufacturing sector. ***Wage rates are in China Yuan Renminbi.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various).
enterprises still account for a majority of these local economies. That may be the reason
why the real wage rates in Liaoning and Shandong are lower than the national average.
Hainan Island is a new province that split from Guangdong province in 1988. Statistical
reports from Hainan to some extent are not consistent with its economic activity. Among
the interior provinces, wage rates in most provinces are lower than the national average5
except in Gansu and Qinghai, two poor provinces in the far west which receive enormous
subsidies from the central government every year.
The income gap between the coastal and the interior regions is not only large, but also
increasing over the years. Figure 1 presents the wage difference between regional wage
and national average wage level. Panel A shows the wage difference in the coastal
provinces for 1988–98. Over the years, the wage rates have risen higher than the national
average. In particular, the regional wages of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong are much
higher than the national average. Panel B presents the wage difference in the interior
provinces for 1988–19. The wage rates are much lower than the national average.
Comparing Panel A and Panel B, the wage gap between the coastal and the interior regions
is increasing.
There is general consensus that China’s income disparities in the late 1990s have been
caused by the trade liberalization. Kanbur and Zhang (2001) argue that openness and
global integration from the late 1970s is the key variable in explaining regional inequality
during the reform period. The important feature of global integration in this period in
China is the concentration of international trade along China’s east coast. Table 2 shows
the average distribution of international trade broken down by customs regimes across the
regions from 1988 to 1998. Guangdong has the highest share in all kinds of trade shares,
and in the share of processing trade in particular.7 Guangdong is also in the leading
position for ordinary trade. Other coastal provinces account for 30 per cent of processing
trade, 57 per cent of ordinary exports, and 73 per cent of ordinary imports.8 It is obvious
that the interior provinces did not play any notable role in either processing exports or
processing imports. The share of processing trade in each interior province is less than
1 per cent. In terms of ordinary trade, a few interior provinces account for between 2–4 per
cent of national ordinary exports. Compared to the performance of the coastal provinces, it
is not impressive. The share of ordinary import by the majority of the interior provinces is
less than 1 per cent, except Jilin, Hubei, and Sichuan.
Figure 2 depicts the association between the regional real wage rates and share of total
export, which indicates a region’s degree of the openness. Most coastal provinces except
Hainan are associated with high degrees of openness and high levels of real wage rates,
whereas the interior provinces cluster around the low share of total exports and low-level
real wage rates.
                                                
7 In 1986, China established two foreign trade regimes: a processing trade regime, which is an export
promoting regime; and an ordinary trade regime, which is an import substitution regime.
8 Beijing outperformed all other provinces in the share of ordinary imports. This might be the result of the
volume of trade generated by the national foreign trade companies assigned to Beijing for 1988–92.6
Figure 1: Comparison of the provincial wage with the national average
Panel A: Coastal provinces
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coastal
Beijing 2.72 9.57 4.28 52.45
Tianjin 2.70 2.83 2.63 1.80
Liaoning 3.54 8.77 3.49 2.45
Shanghai 8.87 8.26 7.13 7.92
Jiangsu 4.51 7.36 4.50 3.08
Zhejiang 2.34 7.04 2.18 1.81
Fujian 4.49 3.65 4.95 1.75
Shandong 3.74 6.95 3.53 1.84
Guangdong 62.31 19.22 62.75 14.95
Hainan 0.15 1.19 0.20 1.65
Interior
Hebei 0.68 3.99 0.54 0.64
Shanxi 0.13 0.93 0.10 0.19
Inner Mongolia 0.13 0.61 0.12 0.28
Jilin 0.20 1.57 0.21 1.17
Heilongjiang 0.25 1.75 0.31 0.75
Anhui 0.37 1.40 0.31 0.48
Jiangxi 0.17 1.25 0.20 0.39
Henan 0.30 1.65 0.28 0.48
Hubei 0.64 2.12 0.51 1.03
Hunan 0.29 1.94 0.23 0.61
Guangxi 0.45 1.63 0.61 0.60
Sichuan 0.46 2.31 0.39 1.43
Guizhou 0.08 0.40 0.08 0.20
Yunnan 0.13 0.97 0.10 0.67
Shaanxi 0.22 1.20 0.17 0.65
Gansu 0.07 0.42 0.09 0.13
Qinghai 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.02
Ningxia 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.04
Xinjiang 0.02 0.62 0.03 0.29
Source: Calculated from Chinese trade data in MOFTEC (various years).
Why does most trade take place in the coastal provinces? We argue that geographical
location matters. The provinces that are located along China’s east coast have advantages
in trading with other countries because they are closer to China’s major markets, such as
Hong Kong and Japan, and have lower transportation costs.8
Table 3 lists average regional export share to Hong Kong and Japan, and distance from
each province to Hong Kong and Japan.9 Guangdong is the province closest to Hong
Kong, and it is the province that accounts for 69.7 per cent of national export to Hong
Kong for 1988–98.
Figure 2: Regional real wage and openness
According to annual trade volumes, Hong Kong, Japan, and the USA are China’s top three
trading partners. Each province, however, has a different ordering of trading partners.
Table 4 shows examples for a few provinces. For instance, Mongolia does not appear to be
an important partner for most provinces except for Inner Mongolia, the province located at
far north of China and neighbouring on Mongolia. Another example is the Jilin province; it
shares a border with North Korea, and there is a Korean-Chinese autonomous region
within the Jilin province. Even though North Korea trades very little with the rest of the
world, it is the fourth most important trading partner of the Jilin province. In this paper, we
find that distance strongly affects the volume of trade.
                                                
9 Distance is the arc distance. In terms of arc distance, some of the coastal provinces are further away from
Hong Kong and Japan than the interior provinces are. In reality, however, the coastal provinces either have
their own ports or are near to ports, and transport goods through shipment, which leads to lower transport
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 (%) (%) (Mile) (Mile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coastal
Beijing 2.4 6.5 1216 1308
Tianjin 1.2 3.6 1169 1261
Liaoning 1.3 19.2 1443 977
Shanghai 3.3 12.9 759 1098
Jiangsu 2.5 10.6 724 1229
Zhejiang 2.1 6.2 657 1196
Fujian 4.0 4.8 289 1507
Shandong 1.8 11.1 1015 1088
Guangdong 69.7 5.5 72 1811
Hainan 0.8 0.5 294 2087
Interior
Hebei 1.1 5.9 733 1405
Shanxi 0.2 0.5 1069 1510
Inner Mongolia 0.2 0.6 1279 1561
Jilin 0.5 1.9 1642 900
Heilongjiang 0.5 1.5 1759 978
Anhui 0.5 0.9 679 1317
Jiangxi 0.7 0.5 445 1475
Henan 0.8 0.9 851 1471
Hubei 1.4 1.1 561 1513
Hunan 1.1 0.7 404 1649
Guangxi 1.3 0.5 370 2083
Sichuan 1.1 1.5 680 1970
Guizhou 0.1 0.3 546 2045
Yunnan 0.4 0.6 778 2315
Shaanxi 0.5 0.7 875 1742
Gansu 0.2 0.3 1125 2006
Qinghai 0.0 0.3 1227 2110
Ningxia 0.1 0.1 1200 1848
Xinjiang 0.4 0.3 2114 2785
Source: First two columns are calculated using Chinese trade data in MOFTEC (various). Column (3) and (4)
are constructed using the information on the longitude and latitude.10
Table 4: Trade partners for some provinces
Province Partner Province Partner
Tianjin(12) Japan Inner Mongolia (15) Japan














Note and source: The partner is ranked according the volume of trade. The volume of trade is calculated using
Chinese trade data from MOFTEC (various).
3 Theoretical model
3.1 Redding and Venables Model
In the context of the Chinese provincial trade, we present the outline of the Redding and
Venables model (2000). It is based on a theoretical model in Fujita et al. (1999). In
addition, it includes transportation costs in trade, and intermediate goods in production.
Consider international trade between the administrative provinces in China and the rest of
the world.10 There are i = 1,..,  29 provinces in China and the Chinese provinces are
trading with j = 1,.., J countries.11 Let Uj denote the utility function in country j with CES
form, cijk refers to the consumption of good k exported from province i to country j.
Suppose province i produces Ni products. Then the representative consumer’s utility
function in country j is,
                                                
10 Here we assume that there is no interprovince trade in China, and the rest of world is trading only with the
Chinese provinces. Since our concern here is wage rates in China, the second assumption will not affect our
results.
11 The number of trading countries j has evolved over the years.11
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The second equation arises the assumption that consumption in country j is equal over all
products k=1,…, Ni sold by province i, i.e., cijk = cij. Good k is used both in consumption
and as an intermediate good, and in both uses there is a constant elasticity of substitution,
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where Ej is country j’s aggregate expenditure, pij is the price of goods produced in province
i and sold in country j. Solving the maximization problem, we can derive country j’s
demand for the product produced in province i,




ij ij = (3)
where Pj refers to country j’s general price index, which is defined as:
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Redding and Venables (2000) refer to the term EjPj
σ-1 in equation (3) as country j’s market
capacity, which depends on total expenditure in country j and overall price.
Turning to the production side, consider a single representative firm in province i with
increasing returns to scale production technology, and an imperfect competitive market.
The firm uses labour and intermediate input with share θ and 1- θ to produce output yi, and
then the firm’s profit is,




i i i i + =
− (5)
where pi is a free on board (f.o.b.) price in province i, yi = Σj cij Tij , and Tij is a transport
costs factor, indicating that Tij units of the product must be shipped to country j in order for
one unit to arrive. The firm has fixed costs of α and marginal costs of β. Then the first term
on the right hand side is revenue and the second term is total costs.
With demand function (3), profit maximizing firms set a single f.o.b. price, pi, such that
prices for the sales in different countries are pij = piTij. The price pi is a constant mark-up








Substituting this pricing behaviour into the profit equation, profits of firm in province i are
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Therefore, the firm breaks even if the total volume of its sales equals,
  β)  /  1)(α (σ y − = (8)
From the demand function, equation (3), it will sell this many units if its price equals,
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Redding and Venables (2000) call this the ‘wage equation’, which implies that the break-
even level of costs, for a provincial firm i, is a function of distance weighted market
capacities.
Equation (10) can be further simplified using equation (4). Given the prices for sale in
different countries, equation (4) can be rewritten as,
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The term Nipi
1-σ measures an exporting province’s supply capacity, as defined in Redding
and Venables (2000). Substituting equation (11) into equation (10) and rearranging, we
have,
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The left-hand side of equation (12) is the wage rate, wi. The constant A on the right-hand
side combines constants from equation (10). SA and MA in equation (13) are defined as
‘supplier access’ and ‘market access’.
Supplier access is distance weighted supplier capacity and measures the proximity of an
importing province i to the supplier of manufactured goods. Market access is distance
weighted market capacity and measures the proximity of an exporting province i to its
international markets. Then equation (12) implies that provinces with high market access
and high supplier access pay relatively high wages because provinces with high market
access face high demand for their products, and provinces with high supplier access can
obtain intermediate goods at lower cost. Neither market access nor supplier access is
observable and will be estimated from a gravity equation in the next section.
3.2 Gravity equation
The demand equation (3) gives the volume of sales from province i to each country j.
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The left-hand side in equation (14) is simply the value of trade between province i and
country j. The right hand side contains province information, trading country information,
and transportation cost. The term Ej(Pj)
  σ -1 is ‘market capacity’. The term Nipi
1-σ is
‘supplier capacity’, which depends on the number of firms and the prices they charge.
Since we focus on the geographic features of trade, these two variables can simply take the
form of regional fixed effects.12 Using the export data from Chinese provinces to the rest
of the world, we can estimate provincial market capacity, whereas the import data by
Chinese provinces from the rest of world is used to obtain supplier capacity. Market
capacity and supplier capacity will be weighted by the distance between province i and
country j, which are market access and supplier access.
                                                
12 Using the fixed effects still addresses the criticism of the conventional gravity equation made by Anderson
and von Wincoop (2000).14
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Empirical specification
A two-stage estimation procedure is used. First a gravity equation is estimated using values
of trade and distances between the Chinese province and its trading partners. The estimates
of market access and supplier access for each province are then constructed using the
estimated coefficients in the gravity equation. The gravity equation can be estimated by
taking logs of equation (14),




i i ij ij i i
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) P ln(E ) p ln(N ) σ)ln(T (1 ) c p ln(N
+ + + + =
+ + − =
(15)
where,
VOTij = Ni Pi cij, values of trade between province i and country j, (16)
distij = Tij, distance between province i and country j,
δi = ln(Ni Pi
1-σ), γj = ln(Ej Pj
σ-1)
δi is a provincial dummy and γj is a trading country dummy. We have two measures of
distance: arc distance, which is the minimum-length arc between two locations, and
internal–external distance, which measures the distance within China and outside of China.
Internal distance is measured by the arc distance between the province and its closest ports,
and external distance is measured by the external arc distance between China’s large and
other international ports. Then the specification of the gravity equation is,
ij j i ij 2 ij 1 0 ij ω γ δ ) (lndist_e β ) ln(dist_i β α ) ln(VOT + + + + + = (17)
where dist_i and dist_e refer to internal and external distance, respectively.
In order to construct market access, we set the dependent variable as the value of exports
from province i to province trading partner, country j. When we construct supplier access,
the dependent variable is the value of imports by province i from country j. Market access
and supplier access for equation (15) are constructed using the formula,
J   1,..,   j   29,   1,..,   i   , distance * e A ˆ S






















Market access and supplier access for equation (17) are, thus,15
J   1,..., j   ,29,     1, i   , dist_e * dist_i * e A ˆ S


























We run the gravity equation annually since the number of trade partners, J, has increased
over the years, as China has become more and more open to the outside world. The change
in the number of trade partners directly affects the estimated coefficients on partner
dummies. Therefore, provincial market access and supplier access evolve, given the fixed
distance between each province and its trade partners. In the second step, given the
provincial market access and supplier access, we specify the following log-linear wage
equation in empirical estimation:
i i 2 i 1 0 i u lnMA λ lnSA λ λ lnw + + + = (20)
where the dependent variable wi is the real wage rate, or the real wage rate in the
manufacturing sector in province i. λ0, λ1, and λ2 are the parameters to be estimated.13 The
error term includes technology differences and other forces that affect regional wage rates,
such as spatial correlation. We will return to these forces in the following robustness
section. The error term ui also includes the residuals in the gravity equation since the
regressors, supplier access and market access, are generated from the gravity equation.
We decompose the Chinese export and import data into two trade regimes. Thus, we have
processing exports, processing imports, ordinary exports, and ordinary imports. Applying
the various export and import data into the gravity equation (15) and (17), and using
definitions in (18) and (19), we arrive at the processing market access, the ordinary market
access, the processing supplier access, and the ordinary supplier access.14 Then the basic
wage equation is:
i i 4 i 3 i 2 i 1 0 i ε A S ˆ lnO A S ˆ lnP A M ˆ lnO A M ˆ lnP lnw + + + + + = ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ (21)
where PMA and PSA refer to processing market access and processing supplier access,
OMA and OSA are ordinary market access and ordinary supplier access.
We are also interested in the impact of the different trade regimes on the regional wage
rates. Compared with the ordinary trade regime, processing trade is more concentrated
along the coast. We expect the effects of processing trade on the wage rate to be higher
                                                
13 Since market access and supplier access are generated from the gravity equation, the OLS standard errors
are invalid. The standard errors are corrected by using the ‘bootstrap technique’.
14 Processing market access measures the proximity of a province exporting processed goods to its
international markets. Ordinary market access measures the proximity of a province exporting ordinary goods
to its international markets. Processing supplier access measures the proximity of a province importing
processing materials from supplier of manufactured goods. Ordinary supplier access measures the proximity
of a province importing ordinary goods from supplier of manufactured good.16
than those obtained from ordinary trade, and processing trade can better explain the wage
inequality than ordinary trade does. Thus, the alternative estimation is to separate
processing market access and processing supplier access from ordinary market access and
ordinary supplier access in the wage equation,
  A S ˆ lnP A M ˆ lnP lnw i i 2 i 1 0 i κ κ κ κ + + + = (22)
i i 2 i 1 0 i ν A S ˆ lnO A M ˆ lnO lnw + + + = ν ν ν (23)
4.2 Robustness test
The error term in equation (21) includes technology differences across provinces and other
factors that affect provincial wage rates. We need to examine the robustness of results with
the inclusion of other factors.
The first experiment we conduct is adding provincial dummies into the wage equation to
capture the differences across provinces. Then we explicitly consider the regional effects.
We use educational level to indicate regional human capital development, and capture the
technology differences. Historically, educational level is higher on the coast than in the rest
of China, though after 1978, the gap increased. Investment on the coast is more than two
times higher than investment in the interior. In particular, there is more foreign direct
investment flowing into the coast because the central government policies favour the
coastal areas. We thus use a preferential policy index to represent the preferential policy
and explicitly consider the policy effect.15
The construction of market access and supplier access involves international trade, which
implies that we are measuring the provincial market access and supplier access to the
international market, and the domestic supply and demand are ignored.16 Instead of taking
the domestic forces into account in the computation of market access and supplier access,
we address the effect of domestic demand in the wage equation. The dataset we use is a
panel data, 29 provinces over 11 years. However, we will not consider the time dummies.
In the process of estimating the gravity equation, we observed the increasing volumes of
exports and imports over the years. We think the coefficients associated with regional
dummies pick up the dynamic changes, and they are carried into the estimated market
access and supplier access. Therefore the time dimensions are embodied in market access
and supplier access. That is why we drop the time dummies in the robustness test.
                                                
15 The preferential policy index is constructed in Démurger et al. (2001).
16 This is due to the lack of information on the interprovincial transactions.17
5 Data
We have three data sources. The first is disaggregate Chinese trade data obtained from the
Customs General Administration, People’s Republic of China, as part of the project
described in Feenstra et al. (1998). This data source provides the value and quantity of
exports and imports under the ordinary trade regime and the processing trade regime
broken down by Chinese provinces for 1988-98. The trade data is 5-digit SITC for 1988-91
and 6-digit HS for 1992-6 and 8-digit HS for 1997-8.
The second is the China Statistical Yearbook (1989-99) which provides other economic
variables for the provinces, such as average nominal wage rates, wage rates in the
manufacturing sector, population, GDP, education level, and retail price deflators. The
detailed definitions of these variables are presented in the appendix. The arc distance data
is obtained from the internet.17
6 Estimation results
6.1 Gravity equation
The first stage of estimation is the gravity equation. We estimate the gravity equation (15)
and (17) annually. For some of the small countries, we have not been able to obtain the
longitude and latitude to calculate the distance and, therefore, these small countries and
islands have been dropped from the sample. Given the detailed information on Chinese
international trade, we aggregate export and import data up to the provincial level under
two different trade regimes. The value of trade is converted into Chinese currency and
deflated using the retail price index.
Table 5 reports the gravity equation estimation for 1995 using arc distance and internal–
external distance. We are interested in the effect of different trade regimes; therefore, the
dependent variables are the log values of processing exports, ordinary exports, processing
imports, and ordinary imports, respectively. Independent variables include the distance
between the Chinese province and its trading partner, Chinese province dummies, and each
province’s trading partner dummies. The estimated coefficients of distances, arc distance
and internal–external distance, are correctly signed and statistically significant at the 1 per
cent level. This is consistent with the notion that a location tends to trade more with the
nearby markets. The model explains 80 per cent of the cross-section variation in the export
data, 60 per cent of the variation in processing import data, and 70 per cent of the variation
in ordinary import data. We use the estimated coefficients of trade partner dummies to
construct market access and supplier access variables, which are used as the explanatory
variables in the second stage regressions.
                                                
17 We obtain each location’s latitude and longitude from www.mapblast.com/myblast/index.mb, and
www.nau.edu/~cvm/latlongdist.html provides the distance calculation.18














(1) (2) (3) (4)
Using arc distance
Log(distance) -1.139 -0.605 -1.508 -0.982
[6.4]** [4.5]** [5.7]** [3.3]**
Using internal–external distance
Log(distance_i) -0.618 -0.443 -0.423 -0.535
[9.4]** [16.5]** [3.9]** [4.95]**
Log(distance_e) -0.696 -0.428 -0.599 -0.706
[4.6]** [3.77]** [2.73]** [2.72]**
Province dummy yes yes yes yes
Partner dummy yes yes yes yes
 
Observations 1805 2923 1031 1082
R-squared 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7
Note: The table shows the estimation results in 1995. The estimated coefficients of external distance in other
years are not all significant. T-statistics are in parentheses. *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.
Source: author.
The constructed market access and supplier access increase over the years, given the fact
that China is gradually integrating into the world economy. Using the results in Guandong
as an example, Figure 3 depicts the evolution of market access and supplier access under
the processing trade regime for 1988-98. And other provinces, especially the provinces on
the coast, have very similar patterns. The results from the ordinary trade regime follow the
same increasing trend.
Figure 4 presents the estimated market access across 29 provinces in 1995. Light columns
refer to market access in the coastal provinces, whereas the dark columns refer to market
access in the interior provinces. Panel A presents the processing market access index.
Almost all the coastal provinces have higher level of processing market access than the
interior provinces except Hainan Island. Panel B shows a similar pattern as Panel A, but
the variation in ordinary market access across provinces is smaller than those in processing
market access.19
Figure 3: Processing indices in Guangdong for 1988-98
Panel A: Processing market access index in Guangdong for 1988-98
Panel B: Processing supplier access index in Guangdong for 1988-98
Figure 5 presents the estimated supplier access across 29 provinces in 1995. In both panels,
the coastal provinces have a higher level of supplier access. The ordinary supplier access in






























Figure 4: Market access index in 1995
Panel A: Processing market access index
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Figure 5: Supplier access index in 1995
Panel A: Processing supplier access index
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6.2 Wage equation: basic model
The second stage of estimation is the wage equation. We use two different wage rate
measures; the average provincial real wage rate, and the average real wage rate in the
manufacturing sector. The independent variables are processing market access, ordinary
market access, processing supplier access, and ordinary supplier access. In the first stage,
we estimate the gravity equation using different measures of distance, therefore we have
two sets of estimated market access and supplier access. One is from the arc distance, and
the other from the internal–external distance. We also estimate the basic wage equation
using only processing trade data or ordinary trade data.
Table 6: Basic wage equation: real wage rate
Using arc distance Using internal–external distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(processing
market access) 0.022 0.027 0.073 0.023
[5.24]** [5.40]** [8.94]** [3.16]**
Log(ordinary market
access) -0.01 0.005 -0.09 -0.01
[1.0] [0.63] [0.31]** [1.15]
Log(processing
supplier access) 0.021 0.018 0.023 0.022
[7.0]** [6.0]** [4.07]** [4.78]**
Log(ordinary supplier
access) 0.022 0.024 0.042 0.034
[3.67]** [4.86]** [7.96]** [7.80]**
Constant 7.309 7.213 7.139 7.44 7.06 7.219
[114.0]** [323.80]** [115.98]** [101.93]** [241.13]** [103.35]**
Observations 317 317 319 317 317 319
R-squared 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.35 0.19 0.1
Note: This table shows the estimation results for the basic wage equation. The dependent variable is the log of
provincial real wage rate. Standard errors are corrected by using bootstrap techniques and t-statistics are in
parentheses.
Source: author.
Table 6 presents the estimation results for the wage equation. The dependent variable is the
log of average provincial real wage rate. The independent variables in the first three
columns are market access and supplier access estimated using arc distance, and those in
the rest three columns are from the internal–external distance. Columns (1) and (4) show
the results of regressing provincial real wage rate on estimated processing market access,
ordinary market access, processing supplier access, and ordinary supplier access using
OLS. Columns (2) and (5) consider the effects under processing trade regime, while
columns (3) and (6) present the results only for ordinary trade regime. The coefficients on
processing market access, processing supplier access, and ordinary supplier access are23
positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in all specifications of wage
equations.
We think the internal–external distance is a more precise measurement of the
transportation costs than arc distance does. And we do find that the market access and
supplier access constructed using the internal–external distance have larger effects on the
real wage rate than ones constructed using the arc distance. It holds for processing trade
and ordinary trade. We also expect that processing market access and supplier access have
stronger impact on the wage rate than ordinary market access and supplier access. This is
because the processing trade is involved in labour-intensive industries. This is true for
processing market access, not for ordinary market access.
Table 7: Basic wage equation: real wage rate in manufacturing sector
Using arc distance Using internal–external distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Processing
Market Access) 0.014 0.018 0.057 0.021
[3.5]** [3.91]** [7.52]** [3.24]**
Log(Ordinary Market
Access) -0.004 0.007 -0.056 0.007
[0.57] [0.92] [0.25] [0.07]
Log(Processing
Supplier Access) 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.019
[5.33]** [5.19]** [2.84]** [4.8]**
Log(Ordinary Supplier
Access) 0.018 0.019 0.038 0.03
[3.91]** [3.96]** [7.83]** [7.63]**
Constant 2.627 2.578 2.5 2.67 2.43 2.51
[43.76]** [126.03]** [44.56]** [39.07]** [92.35]** [39.57]**
Observations 316 316 318 316 316 318
R-squared 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.3 0.12 0.08
Note: This table shows the estimation results for the basic wage equation. The dependent variable is the log of
provincial real wage rate in manufacturing sector. Standard errors are corrected by using bootstrap techniques
and t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: author.
Table 7 presents the estimation results for the wage equation using the average real wage
rate in the manufacturing sector. The structure of Table 7 is the same as Table 6. We find
that, in any specification, the coefficients in Table 7 are smaller than those in Table 6. This
is because the trade data includes both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. The
estimated market access and supplier access obtained from the gravity equation reflect the
potential demand for all kinds of goods, not only manufactured products. Thus, the effect
of market access and supplier access on the provincial real wage rate, which reflects the24
general level of purchasing power during a certain period of time, is stronger than on the
real wage rate in the manufacturing sector.
6.3 Robustness test
First, we consider the robustness of results including regional effects. The regional effects
capture all the differences across the provinces. The dependent variable is the average
provincial real wage rate and the independent variables are processing market access,
ordinary market access, processing supplier access, and ordinary supplier access. Columns
(1) and (3) in Table 8 copy the results in columns (1) and (4) of Table 6, which are the
results in basic wage equation. Columns (2) and (4) report the estimation results including
regional effects. The estimated coefficients on processing market access, processing
supplier access, and ordinary supplier access are still highly statistically significant. In
terms of the magnitude, the estimated coefficients are similar or slightly smaller than in
their counterparts. This indicates the estimation results in Table 6 are robust. The estimated
coefficients on most regional dummy variables are negative, and the dummies for the
interior provinces are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
Table 8: Wage equation: robustness test a
Using Arc Distance Using Internal–external Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Processing
Market Access) 0.022 0.021 0.073 0.047
[5.24]** [7.0]** [8.94]** [4.31]**
Log(Ordinary
Market Access) -0.01 -0.008 -0.09 -0.107
[1.0] [1.38] [0.31]** [-7.78]
Log(Processing
Supplier Access) 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.021
[7.0]** [10.5]** [4.07]** [3.92]**
Log(Ordinary
Supplier Access) 0.022 0.021 0.042 0.027
[3.67]** [5.25]** [7.96]** [4.19]**
Constant 7.309 7.509 7.44 7.509
[114.0]** [84.8]** [101.93]** [84.8]**
Observations 317 317 317 317
R-squared 0.20 0.50 0.35 0.50
Note: This table presents the estimation results on wage equation after taking regional dummies into account.
The dependent variable is the log of provincial real wage rate. Columns (1) and (3) are copied from Table 6.
Columns (2) and (4) have the fixed effects.
Source: author.
Second, we consider the provincial level of education. The provincial educational level is
measured by the ratio of the number of students enrolled in the institutions of higher
education to the regional population. Table 9 presents the robustness results. Columns (1)
and (3) reproduce the results in Table 6. Columns (2) and (4) present the estimated results25
after considering education level. The coefficients on market access and supplier access are
still statistically significant at 1 per cent except ordinary market access. The magnitudes
are smaller than their counterparts. As expected, the educational level positively and
significantly affects the wage rate. The effect of educational level on the wage rate is larger
than market access and supplier access, indicating that the level of education is the main
factor determining the wage rate.
Table 9: Wage equation: robustness test b
Using Arc Distance Using Internal–external Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Processing
Market Access) 0.022 0.016 0.073 0.051
[5.24]** [4.0]** [8.94]** [5.89]**
Log(Ordinary
Market Access) -0.01 -0.011 -0.09 -0.09
[1.0] [1.5] [0.31]** [-6.70]**
Log(Processing
Supplier Access) 0.021 0.018 0.023 0.019
[7.0]** [6.0]** [4.07]** [3.54]**
Log(Ordinary
Supplier Access) 0.022 0.018 0.042 0.03
[3.67]** [3.6]** [7.96]** [5.65]**
Log(Education) 0.182 0.141
[6.84]** [5.58]**
Constant 7.309 7.579 7.44 7.73
[114.0]** [114.5]** [101.93]** [89.07]**
Observations 317 317 317 317
R-squared 0.20 0.4 0.35 0.42
Note: This table presents the estimation results on wage equation after taking education level into account.
The dependent variable is the log of provincial real wage rate.
Source: author.
Third, we introduce policy dummies into the wage equation. We use the preferential policy
index constructed in Démurger et al. (2001), and add dummy variables to the wage equation
to capture the different degrees of deregulation, which are determined by the central
government’s preferential policy. Table 10 reports the results including the policy dummies.
Main results are still robust including the policy dummies, and the effect on the wage rate is
smaller than the counterparts in Table 6. Policy dummies are all statistically significant at 1
per cent, and positively affect the regional wage rates. Similar to educational level, the effect26
of preferential policy on the wage rate is larger than market access and supplier access,
implying that preferential policy plays an import role in determining wage rate.18
Table 10: Wage equation: robustness test c
Using Arc Distance Using Internal–external Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Processing
Market Access) 0.022 0.013 0.073 0.05
[5.24]** [3.25]* [8.94]** [6.15]**
Log(Ordinary
Market Access) -0.01 -0.004 -0.09 -0.068
[-1.0] [-0.44] [0.31]** [-4.87]**
Log(Processing
Supplier Access) 0.021 0.008 0.023 0.013
[7.0]** [1.98]* [4.07]** [2.37]*
Log(Ordinary
Supplier Access) 0.022 0.013 0.042 0.031
[3.67]** [2.16]** [7.96]** [6.12]**
Policy Dummy_1 0.223 0.186
[4.4]** [4.36]**
Policy Dummy_2 0.242 0.194
[5.5]** [0.037]**
Policy Dummy_3 0.348 0.374
[6.3]** [6.95]**
Constant 7.309 7.021 7.44 7.23
[114.0]** [88.8]** [101.93]** [88.6]**
Observations 317 317 317 317
R-squared 0.20 0.3 0.35 0.45
Note: This table shows the estimation results after taking the preferential policy into account. The preferential
policy index is constructed in Démurger et al. (2001), which indicates the various degrees of preferential
policies. They are expected to be positive.
Source: author.
Fourth, we consider the spatial correlations. Up to now, we mainly concern about market
access and supplier access to the international market, ignoring market access and supplier
access to the domestic market. This is due to the lack of information on the interprovincial
trade. In the second stage, to some extent, we are able to pick up the domestic factors by
                                                
18 We also conduct the robustness test by adding the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the wage
equation. The effect of FDI overpowers all other variables. And FDI is closely associated with international
trade, in particular, processing trade, which leads to the endogeneity. That is why we do not report the
robustness test result using FDI.27
considering the wage rates of the nearby provinces. For instance, we are interested in the
real wage rate in province A. Then we choose another two provinces B and C that are
mostly close to province A. We take provinces B and C’s wage rates into account when we
estimate the wage rate in province A besides market access and supplier access. Table 11
shows that the spatial correlation does play a role in explaining the real wage rate. At the
same time, market access and supplier access still statistically affect the real wage rate.
Table 11: Wage equation: robustness test d
Using Arc Distance Using Internal–external Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Processing
Market Access) 0.022 0.02 0.073 0.055
[5.24]** [2.22]* [8.94]** [7.22]**
Log(Ordinary
Market Access) -0.01 -0.008 -0.09 -0.083
[-1.0] [-0.7] [0.31]** [-6.21]**
Log(Processing
Supplier Access) 0.021 0.018 0.023 0.017
[7.0]** [5.0]* [4.07]** [3.04]*
Log(Ordinary
Supplier Access) 0.022 0.017 0.042 0.042





Constant 7.309 7.33 7.44 7.76
[114.0]** [40.8]** [101.93]** [31.55]**
Observations 317 317 317 317
R-squared 0.20 0.3 0.35 0.43
Note: This table shows the estimation results after considering the spatial correlation. The independent




The values of R-squared in Table 6 indicate that 20 per cent of wage differences from the
national average real wage rate can be explained by market access and supplier access.
Processing market access and supplier access explains 12 per cent, and ordinary market
access and supplier access explains 8 per cent. We are also interested in the model’s
prediction on wage inequality for each individual province. Using the estimated coefficient
in column (1) in Table 6, we predict the wage difference between provincial wage rate and
the national average, and compare it with the wage difference obtained from observations.28








(CNY/year) (CNY/year) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3)=(2)/(1) (4)
Total coastal 20
Beijing 674 136 20
Tianjin 239 118 49
Liaoning -181 99 -55
Shaihang 1045 159 15
Jiangsu 142 110 77
Zhejiang 250 117 47
Fujian 214 165 77
Shandong -124 136 -110
Guangdong 771 235 30
Hainan -8 -7 80
Average 23 24
Interior
Hebei -184 62 -33
Shanxi -304 -45 15
Inner Mongolia -418 -128 31
Jilin -291 -93 32
Heilongjiang -433 -47 11
Anhui -259 67 -26
Jiangxi -346 -63 18
Henan -319 -14 4
Hubei -194 87 -45
Hunan -178 -9 5
Guangxi 40 3 8
Sichuan -1443 9 -1
Guizhou -1576 -124 8
Yunnan -1613 -161 10
Shaanxi -1457 -5 0
Gansu -1627 -175 11
Qinghai -1693 -241 14
Ningxia -1632 -180 11
Xinjiang -1649 -197 12
Average 51 5
Note and source: Column (1) is calculated using the real wage rate in China Statistics Yearbook 1996.
Column (2) is calculated using the estimated coefficients in Table 6. Column (4) is the R-squares obtained
from regression results using the whole sample and sub-subsample. CNY=China Yuan Renminbi.29
Table 12 presents the results: column (1) is the wage difference obtained by observation;
column (2) is the predicted wage difference using our model; and column (3) takes the
ratio of the first two columns. The results show that the model can explain about 23 per
cent of the wage difference in the coastal provinces and 5 per cent in the interior provinces.
The model over-predicts the wage difference for a few provinces. Over-predicted
provinces either have ports within the province or are located near a coastal province.
According to the model, these provinces should have relatively high wage rates while in
actuality, the wage rates in the over-predicted provinces are lower than the national
average. This implies that other factors counteract the impact of geographic location.
Column (4) in Table 12 reports the variance explained by the whole sample and subsample
sets. Using the subsample that only contains the observations on the coast, market access
and supplier access can explain 24 per cent of the wage difference in 1995, whereas it is 13
per cent for the interior provinces. Compared with the average level in column (3), which
is obtained from the model prediction, the coastal wage variance directly calculated from
the sample is almost the same as the model prediction, and the interior wage variance is
higher than the model prediction. This implies that the model captures the location
advantage endowed by the coastal provinces and explains a significant portion of the wage
differences for the coastal provinces.
7 Conclusion
Despite China’s remarkable economic growth over the last two decades, a substantial
increase in interregional wage inequality has occurred, which has depressed the economic
growth and led to social tension. The empirical results of this paper support the model’s
prediction that geographic location matters in determining the returns to labour. In
particular, about one quarter of the wage differences in the coastal provinces and 15 per
cent of the wage differences in the interior provinces can be explained by the province’s
market access and supplier access. The results are robust after taking into account other
forces that are also important in determining regional wage rates.
The international experience shows that industrialization can improve a location’s market
access and supplier access. Hanson (1998) provides strong evidence that wage differentials
in Mexico declined after establishing new industry centres along the USA-Mexico border
with Mexico’s trade liberalization. China’s government is now moving in this direction. A
western region development office has been established, targeted at promoting economic
development in the western region.19 This study indicates that more specific efforts should
be devoted to the forces that affect market access and supplier access, such as increasing
infrastructure investment and reducing transportation costs.
                                                
19 The Western Region Development Office was established by the State Council in 2000 to launch a
comprehensive development strategy and to coordinate its implementation.30
Appendix A: data description
This appendix describes data sources and explains variables used.
Sources of data
I have three data sources. First is the Chinese trade data (1988–98) obtained from the
Customs General Administration as part of the project described in Feenstra et al. (1998).
This data source provides detailed information on Chinese international trade. It contains
the commodity codes, countries of origin/destination, countries of purchase/sale, value,
quantity, unit of quantity, customs regime, firm type, and province of import or export.
Second is the China Statistical Yearbook (CSPH various) which provides retail price
index, average wage of formal employees, and average wage of formal employees in the
manufacturing sector. All these economic indicators are at the provincial level. Third is the
Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFTEC various) which
provides average exchange rate of the renminbi against the US dollar.
Definition and explanation of relevant data
Retail price index reflects the general change in prices of retail commodities. The change
and adjustment in retail prices directly affect living expenditure of urban and rural
residents, government revenue, purchasing power of residents, and equilibrium of market
supply and demand, and the proportion of consumption and accumulation.
Average wage of workers and staff refers to the average wage in money terms per person
during certain periods of time for workers and staff of enterprises, institutions, and
government agencies, which reflects the general level of wage income during a certain
period of time.
Exchange rate is the average exchange rate of renminbi against the US dollar in the China
Exchange Market.
The total value of imports and exports at customs refers to the value of commodities
imported into and exported from China.
Education level
The education level is indicated by the ratio of the number of students enrolled in
institutions of higher education to the population. Institutions of higher education refer to
establishments set up according to government evaluation and approval procedures,
enrolling graduates from high schools and providing higher education courses and training
for senior professionals. They include full-time universities, colleges, and higher/further
education institutes.31
Appendix B: distance construction
We construct two measures of distance. The first is a measure of arc distance, in which we
assume that goods are directly transported along the minimum arc distance that connects
two locations. The second is internal–external distance, in which we assume that goods are
first delivered from a province to Tianjin, Shanghai or Guangdong, the three busiest
harbours in China, and from there exported out of China.
Arc distance is the distance from the capital of a province to the capital of a country. To
calculate arc distance, we first obtain the latitude and longitude points for each location at
www.mpablast.com/myblast/index.mb. Then we input the latitude and longitude into the
formula, which is provided at www.nau.edu/~cvm/latlongdist.html, and obtain the arc
distance between any pair of locations.
Internal–external distance takes into account the fact that the interior provinces first
transport the goods to the economic centre or harbours by rail, and from there the goods
are exported out of China. This alternative distance measure corrects the arc distance
measure (which ignores the geographic feature that the interior provinces are land-locked).
The internal distance is the journey time20 between the interior province and the economic
centre (Beijing) or harbour cities (Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangdong). The external
distance is the shipping distance21 from the harbour to the capitals of other countries.
                                                
20 Journey times are published in the official state railway timetable.
21 A world maritime transportation map was used for this purpose.32
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